Original Intent: Whether Recent Reforms Signal a Legislative Break from Marijuana Criminalization Under the Controlled Substance Act by Kim, Oliver J.
Chapman Law Review 
Volume 23 
Issue 1 Symposium: A Fifty-Year Retrospective 
on Major Laws of the 91st Congress 
Article 4 
Winter 6-1-2020 
Original Intent: Whether Recent Reforms Signal a Legislative 
Break from Marijuana Criminalization Under the Controlled 
Substance Act 
Oliver J. Kim 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, chapman.law.review@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Oliver J. Kim, Original Intent: Whether Recent Reforms Signal a Legislative Break from Marijuana 
Criminalization Under the Controlled Substance Act, 23 CHAP. L. REV. 127 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol23/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized editor of Chapman 
University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 	
CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY | FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW | ONE UNIVERSITY DRIVE | ORANGE, 
CALIFORNIA 92866 
WWW.CHAPMANLAWREVIEW.COM 
 
Citation: Oliver J. Kim, Original Intent: Whether Recent Reforms Signal a 
Legislative Break from Marijuana Criminalization Under the Controlled 
Substances Act, 23 CHAP. L. REV. 127 (2020). 
--For copyright information, please contact chapmanlawreview@chapman.edu. 
 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:52 AM 
 
127 
Original Intent: Whether Recent Reforms 
Signal a Legislative Break from Marijuana 
Criminalization Under the Controlled 
Substances Act 
Oliver J. Kim* 
I. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AS THE FIFTY-YEAR-OLD 
FOUNDATION FOR MODERN DRUG POLICY ......................... 131 
A. Early Federal Regulatory Efforts Prior to the 
CSA ........................................................................... 131 
B. The CSA and the Scheduling of Drugs .................... 134 
C. The Political Push to Revise the CSA Toward 
Criminalization ......................................................... 136 
II. A TRIO OF NEW REFORMS: POLICY SUCCESSORS TO THE 
CSA OR SOMETHING DIFFERENT? .................................... 137 
A. The Legislative Responses to the Opioid 
Epidemic ................................................................... 137 
1. CARA .................................................................... 138 
2. SUPPORT ............................................................. 141 
3. Funding for the Opioid Response ........................ 143 
B. Criminal Justice Reform: FIRST STEP .................. 145 
III. MARIJUANA IN THE SHADOW OF THE CSA ........................... 150 
A. State Activity on Marijuana .................................... 150 
B. Recent Federal Activity on Marijuana to Amend 
the CSA ..................................................................... 154 
IV. POLITICAL REALISM: LOOKING AT WHY MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION HAS FAILED AND ITS LESSONS ................... 155 
A. Is the Public Ahead of Politicians? .......................... 156 
B. Difficulties Building an Evidence Base for Policy 
Changes .................................................................... 157 
 
 * President, Center for Healthcare Values, and adjunct professor, University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:52 AM 
128 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 23:1 
C. Different Faces Produce Different Laws and 
Policies ...................................................................... 159 
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 160 
 
“You know, when people think about drugs, they’re just disgusted 
by it. They just want to lock them up, and throw away the key. 
But it’s more complex than that.” 
 
- U.S. President Richard Nixon1 
  
“It is the mission of the Department of Justice to enforce the laws of 
the United States, and the previous issuance of guidance 
undermines the rule of law and the ability of our local, state, tribal, 
and federal law enforcement partners to carry out this mission.” 
 
- U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions2 
 
Given the acrimony of our current political moment,3 it is 
hard to imagine a time when a Republican administration and a 
Democratic Congress could work together and compromise on key 
legislation affecting health, the environment, and criminal 
justice.4 And yet, recent developments on drug policy and 
criminal justice harken back to this period of legislative 
achievement. One of the laws produced in the era that this 
symposium is examining—the Controlled Substances Act 
 
 1 Interview with Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr., Frontline, PBS SOCAL (2000), http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/krogh.html [http://perma.cc/D4HH-XVCM] 
(interviewing Krogh, the White House Deputy for Domestic Affairs under President 
Nixon, and his account of Nixon’s view on addiction). 
 2 THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana 
Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-
marijuana-enforcement [http://perma.cc/8LCS-F3RF] (noting rescission of prior guidance 
on prosecuting marijuana felonies). 
 3 See Lee Rainie et al., Trust and Distrust in America, PEW RES. CTR. 1, 3 (2019), 
http://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/6XTZ-
MSMJ] (“Majorities believe the public’s confidence in the U.S. government and in each other 
is shrinking, and most believe a shortage of trust in government and in other citizens makes 
it harder to solve some of the nation’s key problems.”). 
 4 David T. Courtwright, The Controlled Substances Act: how a “big tent” reform 
became a punitive drug law, 76 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9, 10–11 (2004) (“Nixon 
declared the 1970s to be ‘a great age of reform of the institutions of American government’ 
and pressed for changes in any number of federal laws, those governing the draft, welfare 
system, tax code, revenue sharing, and economic opportunity programs being among the 
best-known examples.”) (citation omitted). 
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(“CSA”)—shares some similarities in its development with three 
pieces of legislation on drug policy and criminal justice that 
passed in the last five years.5 The legacy of the CSA certainly 
shaped these issues over the last fifty years. 
The original intent of the CSA was to be a reform package 
that sought to harmonize the country’s approach to drug policy.6 
As part of a Nixon-era set of reforms, the CSA was not intended 
to be a harsh, punitive approach to drug control; however, in the 
intervening years, the CSA lost its original purpose, as political 
winds changed in ways that shifted the focus of the CSA toward 
more punitive approaches toward this goal.7  
Despite the political gridlock currently plaguing our federal 
government, Congress has come together under two very different 
presidential administrations to pass legislation on substance 
abuse and criminal justice reform.8 Indeed, Congress actually 
passed legislation focused on the country’s opioid epidemic, not 
once, but twice: the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act9 
(“CARA”) in 2016, and then the Substance Use-Disorder 
Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment 
(“SUPPORT”) for Patients and Communities Act10 in 2018. The 
relative ease by which Congress passed these two bills, as well as 
the more difficult passage of the criminal justice reform bill, the 
Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely 
Transitioning Every Person (“FIRST STEP”) Act,11 might signal a 
policy shift and a political change in our views on drug policy and 
criminalization that we have not seen in decades, and could 
harken back to returning to the original intent of the CSA of 
balancing competing policies in its approach to drug policy. 
The surprising break in partisanship to address addiction 
policy might strike some as a sign of an opportune time to make 
a major reform of the CSA regarding a major public policy 
problem posing a conflict between a majority of the states and 
the federal government. Many states are considering whether to 
legalize marijuana for clinical and non-clinical “recreational” 
purposes, and some states already have adopted regulatory 
 
 5 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
 6 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 12. 
 9 Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130 
Stat. 695 (2016).  
 10 Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for 
Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-721, 132 Stat. 3894 (2016). 
 11 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). 
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schemes for marijuana,12 but the federal regulatory scheme 
under the CSA has put states’ ability to legalize marijuana in 
question. Fifty years after the passage of the CSA, is it not time 
to reconsider how we approach marijuana? Are CARA, 
SUPPORT, FIRST STEP, and the changes at the state level 
precursors for a change to the CSA in an area that seems to be 
overwhelmingly popular?13 
The answer to that question might be yes, but I would argue 
that the political reality is that reform at the federal level is not 
necessarily coming soon—even if the 2020 elections result in 
partisan changes in Congress and the federal government. 
Instead, I argue that, despite these seemingly monumental bills 
in a time of epic dysfunction, there is no fundamental shift in 
drug policy at the federal level. This “policy plateau” is evident by 
the failure to move legislation to amend the CSA in order to give 
states the ability to regulate marijuana.  
While states continue to move forward on drug policy, the 
conflict with federal law creates conflict in many important policy 
areas, including medical practice, banking policy, and taxation. 
Having legal and policy clarity by amending the CSA would 
provide needed certainty, but several questions still face 
advocates and policymakers. Are those recent reforms—CARA, 
SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP—a harbinger for reform of the 
CSA? How do issues such as class and race play into potential 
reforms? Are there potential lessons that can be learned in order 
to alter the CSA? Given the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gonzales v. Raich that federal laws such as the CSA still apply 
regardless of state regulations, including in the traditional state 
sphere of medical professionals’ scope of practice,14 these 
questions are important to answer in order to solve the conflict 
emerging between states’ movement toward legalization and 
federal inaction. 
To answer these questions, this Article will analyze the 
various aforementioned laws in the context of the current 
political environment. First, the Article will provide an overview 
of the CSA’s legislative history, particularly looking at the initial 
intent of the law against how it was subsequently amended in a 
different political climate. Second, the Article will compare the 
 
 12 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10. 
 13 Hannah Hartig & A.W. Geiger, About six-in-ten Americans support marijuana 
legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/ 
08/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/ [http://perma.cc/P75F-V85N]. 
 14 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
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response to the opioid epidemic to marijuana policy at the state 
and federal level. Third, the Article will discuss the legal, 
political, and policy conflicts between the opioid legislation and 
the failure to pass marijuana legislation at both the state and 
federal level. Finally, the Article will conclude that, despite some 
advances on bipartisanship reform for drug laws, these small steps 
are insufficient to change the law at the federal level to decriminalize 
marijuana. The opioids legislation, CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST 
STEP, represent different pieces that share some common threads 
with the CSA as initially envisioned; however, there are key 
differences between the efforts to be explored that could help 
advocates and policymakers. 
I. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AS THE FIFTY-YEAR-OLD 
FOUNDATION FOR MODERN DRUG POLICY 
American drug policy includes both regulation of substances 
for patient use on the commercial market, as well as interdiction 
of substances believed to be dangerous for human consumption or 
only consumed for limited purposes under close supervision. This 
section provides a brief snapshot of the policy developments that 
provide the foundation for our current drug regime. 
A. Early Federal Regulatory Efforts Prior to the CSA 
During the twentieth century, the federal government 
exercised increasing control over drug policy, by regulating the 
use of certain drugs through a complex approval process and 
supervising medical professionals, and by criminalizing other 
drugs as illegal substances.15 In one stream of federalizing drug 
policy, Congress began to formalize the process for demonstrating 
the safety of prescription drugs starting with the 1906 passage of 
the Pure Food and Drugs Act.16 This law, and a series of 
subsequent laws, led to the creation of the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”), which became seen as “a ‘gatekeeper’ to 
protect public health by using its regulatory authority over the 
drug approval process.”17 For instance, the FDA began using its 
authority to regulate the use of addictive non-narcotic drugs after 
the medical community recognized that drugs such as 
 
 15 Courtwright, supra note 4; see also infra SPILLANE note 17.  
 16 Oliver J. Kim, Trying and Dying: Are Some Wishes at the End of Life Better Than 
Others?, 41 DALHOUSIE L.J. 94, 97 (Spring 2018). 
 17 Id.; see also JOSEPH F. SPILLANE, Debating the Controlled Substances Act, 76 
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 17, 19 (2004) (discussing how federal law “created a class 
of drugs available only on a physician’s prescription, and gave the FDA authority to 
designate which drugs would be placed in that category”) (citation omitted). 
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“barbiturates were not addicting in the narcotic sense, but that 
they were habit forming and subject to improper use.”18 
In another stream of federalization, Congress began 
addressing the growing concern about the addictive nature of 
narcotics, ultimately leading to a process of interdiction and 
criminalization.19 Initially, Congress used its tax power to pass 
the Harrison Act20 as a means of regulating narcotics (defined as 
opioids and cocaine) and, thus, made the Treasury Department 
the initial regulator of these substances.21 This statute marked a 
substantial shift in regulatory policy, as the states had 
principally been the primary regulators by enacting a patchwork 
of policies.22  
The Treasury Department largely resisted adding additional 
non-narcotics to its responsibilities under its Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics.23 But the Bureau’s director, Harry Anslinger, did favor 
greater criminalization of marijuana at both the state and federal 
level.24 Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937, adding 
the only non-narcotic drug under the jurisdiction of the Treasury 
Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics.25 Although the 
Marijuana Tax Act was framed as a revenue law to quell 
Anslinger’s concerns about the constitutionality of regulating 
marijuana, it effectively banned the use of marijuana given the 
high cost of the tax.26	Subsequently, Congress went further in the 
Boggs Act by adding criminal penalties, including mandatory 
minimum sentences for possession and trafficking of marijuana 
and narcotics,27 and the federal government encouraged states to 
pass similar legislation to standardize drug laws.28 
 
 18 SPILLANE, supra note 17. 
 19 Id. at 18. 
 20 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). 
 21 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 18. 
 22 See Kathleen Ferraiolo, From Killer Weed to Popular Medicine: The Evolution of 
American Drug Control Policy, 1937-2000, 19 J. POL’Y HIST. 147, 150 (2007); see also 
Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10. 
 23 SPILLANE, supra note 17. 
 24 JOSEPH F. SPILLANE & DAVID B. WOLCOTT, A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 233 (2013) (noting that Anslinger “presented marijuana as addictive, a 
gateway to more serious drugs like heroin, and a source of crime”); Ferraiolo, supra note 
22, at 153–54. 
 25 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24. 
 26 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 154; David Katner, Up in Smoke: Removing 
Marijuana from Schedule I, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167, 173 (2018). 
 27 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 234. See VIRGINIA L. ROTHWELL, The 
Boggs Act in Encyclopedia of Drug Policy 96–97 (Mark Kleiman & James Hawdon, eds., 
2011), for a discussion of how the Boggs Act also marked the first time that marijuana 
and narcotics had been combined in legislation. 
 28 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 234. 
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During the 1960s, there was a growing recognition of 
fundamental problems with the differing streams of federal 
regulation, as “[n]ew substances were being introduced into 
widespread use faster than research could develop and the 
traditional addiction model, which had been based on physical 
dependence, was not adequate.”29 Instead of providing a unified 
response to the patchwork of state policies, “Congress’s habit of 
ad hoc legislation, sometimes based on the constitution’s taxing 
power and sometimes on its commerce power, had produced a 
patchwork of enforcement agencies with different priorities and 
resources.”30 The Johnson Administration was unable to 
formulate legislation in time for consideration before the 1968 
election, resulting in the incoming Nixon Administration 
modifying the initial proposals that ultimately became the CSA.31 
In 1970, Congress passed the CSA as part of the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act32 as an effort to consolidate 
these different approaches.33 Policymakers realized the country was 
facing “three very visible drug problems”: an increase in heroin use in 
urban areas, as well as among service members stationed in 
Vietnam, and in young people using marijuana and psychedelics.34 
Historians note a difference in political philosophy between the 
Democratic majority in Congress and the Nixon Administration 
toward criminal justice, but these opposing partisans were able to 
merge their differences.35 For instance, “the conventional liberal 
wisdom [was] that federal officials had botched the psychotropic 
drug problem while demonizing narcotic offenders and 
stonewalling maintenance experiments. . . . Above all, the 
reformers thought that the old sanctions, especially those 
involving marijuana, were unfair and inflexible, and brought 
disrepute upon the control system.”36 Key officials in the 
administration agreed with that assessment and believed “that 
the new guidelines [under the CSA] would make the system 
fairer and more workable, while preserving moral distinctions 
 
 29 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 21. 
 30 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10. 
 31 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 21. 
 32 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236. 
 33 SPILLANE, supra note 17. 
 34 Jerome H. Jaffe, One Bite of the Apple: Establishing the Special Action Office for 
Drug Abuse Prevention, 43, 45 in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN (David Musto ed., 2002). 
 35 For a video discussing how President Nixon had to work with Democrats in order to 
govern, see Bridging The Branches—How President Nixon Worked With A Democratic Congress, 
RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.nixonfoundation.org/2018/04/bridging-
branches-president-nixon-worked-democratic-congress/ [http://perma.cc/V7RS-733P]. 
 36 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 12. 
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among casual users, addicts, and organized criminal traffickers, 
with the heaviest sentences reserved for the latter.”37 
Conversely, the Nixon Administration deemed drug abuse a 
priority issue because “the problem was getting out of hand.”38 
Nixon himself believed that drug misuse and addiction was a 
cause of crime, and he had campaigned on reducing the supply 
side of this equation.39 Thus, the administration had determined 
that the existing legal authorities were inadequate and needed to 
be replaced with a single modern law that would give the 
government the appropriate tools and flexibility in order to combat 
this problem.40  
Recognizing the need to compromise with the more liberal 
“establishment”41 in Congress, President Nixon’s submission to 
Congress, which became the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act, reflected a compromise between 
interdiction and public health approaches to drug control:  
When Nixon submitted his drug bill to Congress in July 1969, he 
outlined a 10-point action plan. Characteristically, points 1–5 dealt 
with supply control. Points 6–10 emphasized education, research, 
rehabilitation, training, and communication. The legislation itself 
reflected this multi-front approach. The CSA was part (Titles II and 
III) of . . . the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
of 1970. Title I provided authority and money for the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to mount additional 
prevention and treatment efforts through community mental health 
centers and public health service hospitals. It authorized the National 
Institute of Mental Health to increase research and training. It 
protected the privacy rights of subjects under the care of approved 
researchers. All of these were unmistakably public-health initiatives, 
part of the same legislation as the CSA.42 
B. The CSA and the Scheduling of Drugs 
At the heart of the CSA is its regulatory scheme for 
classifying drugs under five different schedules. The CSA 
initially classified certain drugs under these schedules, with 
marijuana being included under Schedule I.43 The Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) within the Justice 
Department can add additional drugs to the schedule as a 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 11. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 10. 
 41 Id. at 11. 
 42 Id. 
 43 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(d)(1). 
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“controlled substance.”44 Schedule I is the most restrictive 
category and reserved for substances with no medical value, with 
Schedule V being the least restrictive.45 In order to be classified 
as a Schedule I controlled substance, the DEA must find that the 
drug has a high potential for abuse,46 there is no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,47 and 
“[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other 
substance under medical supervision.”48 The CSA allows the 
Attorney General to reclassify a controlled substance to a lower 
schedule or completely remove the substance in question.49 But 
as a political compromise,50 the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) or “any interested party” can petition 
for adding, reclassifying, or removing a drug from the schedule, 
just as the Attorney General could on “his own motion.”51 
Since the CSA initially classified marijuana under Schedule 
I, there have been five petitions to reschedule it—all unsuccessful 
and often lengthy.52 As part of a 2016 denial, the DEA laid out a 
five-part test to determine whether a drug has an accepted 
medical use, as follows: “[T]he drug’s chemistry is not known and 
reproducible; there are no adequate safety studies; there are no 
adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy; the drug is 
not accepted by qualified experts; and the scientific evidence is 
 
 44 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
 45 For a useful summary with examples of drugs falling under each of the five 
schedules, see Elizabeth Hartney, Controlled Drugs in the Controlled Substance Act, 
VERYWELLMIND (Sept. 29, 2019), http://www.verywellmind.com/what-are-controlled-drugs-
22310 [http://perma.cc/HC5N-MCX6]. Drug schedules are different from the five classes of 
drugs—narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids—that fall 
under the CSA. Id. 
 46 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A). 
 47 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B). 
 48 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(C). 
 49 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
 50 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 22. 
 51 21 U.S.C. § 811(a). See also 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (explaining that when making this 
determination, the DEA must consider eight factors laid out in the CSA: “(1) Its actual or 
relative potential for abuse. (2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. 
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance. (4) Its 
history and current pattern of abuse. (5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. 
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. (7) Its psychic or physiological dependence 
liability. (8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already 
controlled under this subchapter.”). 
 52 Diane Hoffmann et al., Will The FDA’s Approval Of Epidiolex Lead to 
Rescheduling Marijuana?, HEALTH AFFAIRS: HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (July 12, 2018), 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180709.904289/full/ [http://perma.cc/94UU-
ZWF6] (“The first petition (1972) took 22 years before a decision was issued; the second (1995) 
took six years; and a 2002 petition was not decided until 2011. The most recent petitions (2009 
and 2011) were decided in 2016.”). 
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not widely available.”53 Several petitioners have attempted to sue 
the DEA to force proceedings to go forward, but the courts have 
upheld the DEA’s denials.54 
Classifying a drug under Schedule I greatly restricts 
potential research that could demonstrate whether a controlled 
substance actually has medical use.55 Although Congress 
expanded research at the National Institute of Mental Health at 
the same time it was passing the CSA,56 the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act gave greater control to the 
Justice Department—rather than HHS—to approve research 
using Schedule I controlled substances under the rationale of 
preventing such drugs from being diverted inappropriately in 
clinical trials.57 
C. The Political Push to Revise the CSA Toward Criminalization  
Although the CSA had initially been passed with “something 
in it for everybody,”58 it increasingly became pulled toward 
criminalization and away from public health. In the 1970s, angry 
and worried middle-class parents grew fearful of a seemingly 
growing acceptance of marijuana use among young people.59 
Concerned about the harms of marijuana and its possible 
gateway effect to harsher drugs, organized groups of parents 
successfully lobbied for tougher criminal sanctions and “zero 
tolerance” laws, rather than pushing for harm-reduction 
approaches.60 Subsequently, as cocaine, and then crack, became 
cheaper and easier to produce, the government increased its law 
enforcement efforts, often with bipartisan majorities.61  
These fears, however, accompanied prejudices as illicit drug 
use was associated with “minority subcultures—musicians, artists, 
urban African Americans, Hispanic laborers.”62 Thus, it was not 
 
 53 Denial of Petition To Initiate Proceedings To Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 
53688 (proposed Aug. 12, 2016). 
 54 Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 438–41 (D.C. Cir. 2012); All. for 
Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1131–33 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 55 Grace Wallack & John Hudak, Marijuana Rescheduling: A Partial Prescription for 
Policy Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 208–12 (2016). 
 56 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 11. 
 57 See SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 22–23. 
 58 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 13.  
 59 Id. While seemingly concerned about the societal costs of potentially losing a 
generation to drug abuse, Nixon also stoked parents’ fears as a political device by arguing, 
“It is doubtful that an American parent can send a son or daughter to college today 
without exposing the young man or woman to drug abuse.” Id. at 11.  
 60 Id. at 13. 
 61 Id. 
 62 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 260. 
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just the fear of “white middle-class youth” engaging in drug use, 
but their association with these perceived undesirable, deviant 
elements of society.63 While the CSA initially reformed sentencing 
guidelines, subsequent legislation reversed this trend.64 
II. A TRIO OF NEW REFORMS: POLICY SUCCESSORS TO THE CSA OR 
SOMETHING DIFFERENT? 
In comparison to the time period that this symposium 
focuses on, today’s congressional arena has been characterized by 
gridlock65 and deemed a “legislative graveyard.”66 Despite this 
hostile environment, CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP all 
achieved rare bipartisan support in an increasingly polarized 
legislature. This section will provide an overview of each of these 
laws, as well as some of the political and legislative machinations 
behind the passage of each law. 
A. The Legislative Responses to the Opioid Epidemic 
Over the last twenty years, Americans’ use of opioids has 
increased dramatically: the sales of prescription opioids nearly 
quadrupled since 1999 due to several potential causes.67 At the 
same time, the death rate due to overdoses tripled to 19.8 per 
100,000 individuals, with nearly two-thirds of deaths involving 
either prescription or illegal opioids.68 Deaths due to opioid 
overdoses exceed automobile accidents in the United States.69 The 
opioid epidemic’s toll on the American public’s health is so extensive 
that it is linked to a decline in the country’s life expectancy.70 In 
addition to the loss of life, the opioid epidemic has had other public 
health consequences: nearly two million Americans have a 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 Katharine A. Neill, Tough on Drugs: Law and Order Dominance and the Neglect of 
Public Health in U.S. Drug Policy, 6 WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 375, 382–83 (2014). 
 65 Rainie, supra note 3, at 14. 
 66 Jordain Carney & Maggie Miller, McConnell under fire for burying election bills in 
‘legislative graveyard’, HILL (July 27, 2019, 5:50 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/ 
454967-mcconnell-under-fire-for-burying-election-security-bills-in-legislative-graveyard 
[http://perma.cc/S4FD-HUDQ]. 
 67 Claire Felter, The U.S. Opioid Epidemic, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
http://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-opioid-epidemic?gclid=Cj0KCQjwjrvpBRC0ARIsAFrFu
V9q18QVmo9U03Pa7jQAz6HUTRZwbFDNRotsevt-y1MMpnTzTGwY6toaAuF_EALw_wcB 
[http://perma.cc/D4MH-FSMJ] (last updated Sept. 17, 2019). 
 68 HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016 
5 (Dec. 2017), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf [http://perma.cc/6JQU-XC7J]. 
 69 Ken Kolosh, Accidental Injury Becomes #3 Cause of Death in the U.S., NAT’L 
SAFETY COUNCIL (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.nsc.org/safety-first-blog/accidental-injury-
becomes-3-cause-of-death-in-the-us-1 [http://perma.cc/4VVS-QM7F]. 
 70 Felter, supra note 67. 
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prescription opioid use disorder, leading to an increase in illicit 
opioid use and diseases, such as Hepatitis C and HIV.71  
Many Americans, particularly in rural communities, believed 
that a government response was necessary to stem the tide of 
opioid misuse.72 By the 2018 midterm elections, sponsoring 
legislation aimed at the opioid epidemic was seen as politically 
astute.73 Although advocates criticized the legislation because 
these bills failed to provide sustainable funding for needed 
services,74 politicians viewed introducing legislation as a response 
to a pressing societal concern, while being fiscally responsible.75 
1. CARA 
By 2014, drug overdose deaths had nearly tripled over a 
fifteen-year period, and over three out of five of the 47,055 drug 
overdose deaths that year involved an opioid.76 Shortly before 
the 2014 midterm elections, a small bipartisan group of 
Senators—mainly from states seeing the beginning of the 
epidemic77—introduced the first version of CARA.78 Subsequently, a 
 
 71 Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Health IT Playbook, 
HEALTHIT, http://www.healthit.gov/playbook/full [http://perma.cc/V88V-7VY4] (last updated 
Feb. 28, 2018). 
 72 Danielle Kurtzleben, Poll: Rural Americans Rattled By Opioid Epidemic; 
Many Want Government Help, NPR (Oct. 17, 2018, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
2018/10/17/656515170/poll-rural-americans-rattled-by-opioid-epidemic-many-want-government-
help [http://perma.cc/XEV2-SUEE]. 
 73 See Brianna Ehley & Jennifer Haberkorn, Tough reelection? Sponsor an opioid bill, 
POLITICO (June 16, 2018, 6:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/16/lawmakers-
opioid-bills-midterms-624926 [http://perma.cc/URD8-XG5H]; see also Katie Zezima & Colby 
Itkowitz, Flailing on Fentanyl, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/2019/investigations/fentanyl-epidemic-congress/?wpisrc=al_news__alert-politics--
alert-national&wpmk=1 [http://perma.cc/X9JK-DWT4] (interviewing the House Republican 
sponsor of the bill to increase sentencing minimums for trafficking fentanyl, about his belief 
that the bill was not considered because, “[a]s a Republican from a reliably red district who 
wasn’t going to face a difficult path to reelection, he didn’t need a legislative success to tout on 
the campaign trail.”). 
 74 Brianna Ehley, Congress’ latest opioid bill won’t solve the crisis, POLITICO (Sept. 
17, 2018, 7:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/17/congress-opioids-crisis-
illegal-drugs-792373 [http://perma.cc/3SQY-R9H2] (“Public health experts and first 
responders say the massive bipartisan legislation . . . takes some important steps toward 
better access to treatment but lacks the urgency, breadth and steady long-term funding 
required to quell the emergency . . . .”). 
 75 Ehley & Haberkorn, supra note 73 (“Republican supporters of the bills say the 
extended time on the floor reflects how seriously the House takes the opioid issue. Most of 
the bills sponsored by vulnerable lawmakers are not controversial, in part because they 
don't designate new spending.”). 
 76 Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—United 
States, 2010-2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445 (2016). 
 77 Yongwen Jiang et al., Rhode Island Unintentional Drug Overdose Death Trends 
and Ranking—Office of the State Medical Examiners Database, R.I. MED. J. 33, 34 (2018), 
http://www.rimed.org/rimedicaljournal/2018/02/2018-02-33-health-jiang.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/P4NY-Q8KB]. 
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bipartisan group of Representatives79 introduced a companion bill.80 
Because the bills had been introduced so late in the 113th Congress, 
there was little chance either bill would move; however, advocates 
responded positively to the legislators’ interest and began to plan for 
the next Congress.81 
The 2014 elections resulted in giving Republicans control of 
both chambers of the 114th Congress, for the first time since the 
2006 elections, while President Obama was in his final two years 
of office.82 Republicans initially used their new majorities in a 
fruitless attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),83 but 
subsequently, both parties focused on working collaboratively 
around two major initiatives—the opioid epidemic84 and an 
investment in medical research85—in an effort to demonstrate 
the ability to govern and to produce legislative victories. 
Advocates for CARA noted that “the dramatic increase in 
opioid-related overdose deaths in virtually every Congressional 
district in America” was tragically one of the leading factors that 
raised attention to the issue and created a sense of urgency to pass 
the bill into law.86 When CARA was signed into law on July 22, 2016, 
 
 78 S. 2839, 113th Cong. § 1 (2014).  
 79 Jim Sensenbrenner, Sensenbrenner, Scott, Marino, Bass, Joyce, Ryan Introduce 
Comprehensive Legislation to Combat Drug Addiction, JIM SENSENBRENNER (Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/2014/12/sensenbrenner-scott-marino-bass-joyce-ryan-introduce-
comprehensive-legislation-to-combat-drug-addiction [http://perma.cc/YB77-CAA3]. 
 80 H.R. 5845, 113th Cong. § 1 (2014). 
 81 Sensenbrenner, supra note 79 (noting that the bill had been endorsed by ninety-three 
national organizations). 
 82 Republicans Rule House and Senate for First Time in 8 Years, NBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 
2014, 1:38 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/republicans-rule-house-senate-
first-time-8-years-n241126 [http://perma.cc/JW8U-2C96]. 
 83 Russell Berman, ‘Promise Kept’: The Senate Finally Votes to Repeal Obamacare, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/the-senate-
finally-votes-to-repeal-obamacare/418644/ [http://perma.cc/CZQ2-DQPH] (noting the 
Senate’s party-line, 52-47, in favor of a reconciliation bill that gutted, but did not fully 
repeal, the ACA was “purely symbolic” because President Obama vetoed the bill). 
 84 Paul Demko & Brianna Ehley, Republicans cast opioid bill as their health care 
achievement, POLITICO (Sept. 22, 2018, 6:44 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/22/ 
republicans-defend-opioid-bill-achievement-796837 [http://perma.cc/J3QH-8UEK]. Note 
that advocates had urged federal intervention much earlier. Geoff Mumford, Chasing 
the dragon: Psychology informs strategies to contain the opioid epidemic, AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N (May 2016), http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2016/05/opioid-
epidemic [http://perma.cc/7A8N-62D3] (While “it would appear from news accounts that 
the epidemic reached crisis proportions only recently,” advocates had begun “to raise 
the alarm as early as 2006”). 
 85 Norm Ornstein, A Bipartisan Victory for Medical Research in Congress, ATLANTIC 
(July 13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/21st-century-cures-
act-bipartisan/398369/ [http://perma.cc/M5MD-MK9R]. 
 86 Jeremiah Gardner & Robert Ashford, CARA History & Breakdown, HAZELDEN 
BETTY FORD FOUND. (July 11, 2016), http://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/articles/gardner/ 
cara-history-and-breakdown [http://perma.cc/Z53T-9SUS]. 
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advocates hailed it as the “first major federal addiction legislation in 
forty years and the most comprehensive effort undertaken to address 
the opioid epidemic, encompassing all six pillars necessary for such a 
coordinated response—prevention, treatment, recovery, law 
enforcement, criminal justice reform, and overdose reversal.”87 
Thus, CARA mirrored some of the original promise of the 
CSA. First, CARA contained numerous public-health approaches 
to combating the opioid epidemic. In addition to a general grant 
program for community-based organizations,88 CARA also 
increased access points for community-based treatment,89 
training for first responders,90 grants targeted at addiction 
treatment for pregnant and postpartum women,91 and the types 
of health professionals who could prescribe medications to treat 
opioid misuse disorders.92 Second, CARA contained several 
grants aimed at improving law enforcement responses, including 
for state, local, and tribal law enforcement to pursue innovative 
approaches to policing,93 and for states to establish prescription 
drug monitoring programs.94 Third, CARA reformed processes at 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) to address how the VA 
health system treats pain and prescribes opioids.95 
But critics raised concerns about CARA’s approach. First, 
critics noted that CARA did not contain actual funding, but 
rather provided for authorizations for appropriations.96 Indeed, 
including actual funding would have endangered passage in the 
 
 87 The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), CADCA, http://www.cadca.org/ 
comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-cara [http://perma.cc/7QL2-BYGW]. 
 88 Id. §§ 103, 601. 
 89 Id. §§ 107, 110. 
 90 Id. § 202. 
 91 Id. §§ 501, 503. 
 92 Id. § 303. 
 93 Id. § 201. 
 94 Id. § 109. 
 95 Id. Title IX. 
 96 Bill Heniff, Jr., Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process, CONG. RES. 
SERV. (Nov. 26, 2012) (discussing the two-step process for federal spending to carry out a 
program, which includes: “(1) enactment of an authorization measure that may create or 
continue an agency, program, or activity as well as authorize the subsequent enactment of 
appropriations; and (2) enactment of appropriations to provide funds for the authorized 
agency, program, or activity.”). CARA authorized a total of $187 million annually in new 
appropriations, but there is no guarantee that Congress will allocate that level of funding. 
See Jeremiah Gardner & Robert Ashford, CARA History & Breakdown, HAZELDEN BETTY 
FORD FOUND. (July 11, 2016), http://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/articles/gardner/cara-
history-and-breakdown [http://perma.cc/Z53T-9SUS]; see also Mumford, supra note 84 
(“Because funding CARA and passing CARA are separate legislative processes, 
skirmishes over how to pay for CARA programs may continue to play out long after the 
bill is successfully conferenced and sent to the president for signature.”). 
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House.97 Although Democrats decried the lack of actual funding 
and unsuccessfully attempted to amend CARA to do so,98 they 
ultimately supported the bill.99 Second, there was a question 
about equity in regards to how Congress was responding to the opioid 
epidemic versus its prior responses to drug abuse. The Centers from 
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) found that victims of opioid 
overdoses were overwhelmingly white, tended to be male, and 
middle-aged.100 Four of the five most affected states—West Virginia, 
New Hampshire, Kentucky, and Ohio101—are rural and tended to 
lean Republican or be politically competitive.102 Thus, in addition to 
the moral and public-health reasons for the response to the epidemic, 
there was a political incentive for the majority party to respond to 
this drug epidemic differently than prior federal responses.103 
2. SUPPORT 
A little over two years after CARA’s passage, Congress 
revisited the opioid epidemic, passing SUPPORT and sending it to 
President Trump for signature.104 Although the opioid epidemic 
was still raging, a cynic might question whether a second bill was 
needed so quickly or whether SUPPORT was meant to give 
Republicans a healthcare achievement prior to the 2018 midterm 
elections. Indeed, prior to the passage of SUPPORT, Congressional 
 
 97 Burgess Everett & Jennifer Haberkorn, Anti-opioid bill touted by vulnerable 
Republicans hits snag, POLITICO (June 30, 2016, 1:03 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/ 
2016/06/congress-republicans-opioid-bill-224985 [http://perma.cc/7SFP-R6UW] (quoting a 
key Senate Republican that the issue over including funding was “more of an issue in the 
House than it is in the Senate—from the standpoint of making sure things are paid for 
and there isn’t mandatory funding”). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Despite Discord Over Funding, Congress Sends Opioid Bill To President’s Desk, 
KHN (July 14, 2016), http://khn.org/morning-breakout/despite-discord-over-funding-
congress-sends-opioid-bill-to-presidents-desk/ [http://perma.cc/GS74-FAZK]. In his signing 
statement, President Obama also indicated that he was “deeply disappointed that 
Republicans failed to provide any real resources for those seeking addiction treatment to 
get the care that they need. In fact, they blocked efforts by Democrats to include $920 
million in treatment funding.” Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on 
the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, WHITE HOUSE (July 22, 2016), 
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/22/statement-president-
comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-2016 [http://perma.cc/G8JY-68PE].  
 100 Rudd, supra note 76, at 1448, 1450 tbls.1 & 2. 
 101 See id. at 1447 fig.1. 
 102 See Paul Chisholm, Analysis Finds Geographic Overlap In Opioid Use And Trump 
Support In 2016, NPR (June 23, 2018, 8:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/06/23/622692550/analysis-finds-geographic-overlap-in-opioid-use-and-trump-
support-in-2016 [http://perma.cc/U86H-NGKS]. 
 103 162 CONG. REC. 2372 (2016) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) (noting that many of 
those who turned to crack cocaine were incarcerated rather than offered treatment). 
 104 See Devin Miller, Opioids bill becomes law; AAP advances key priorities, AAP 
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018), http://www.aappublications.org/news/2018/11/20/washington112018 
[http://perma.cc/NL9S-J2G9].  
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Republicans attempted to repeal the ACA again with the knowledge 
that President Trump would sign any repeal legislation;105 however, 
the congressional repeal effort failed again.106  
SUPPORT faced some of the same criticisms related to 
sustainable funding as CARA did.107 But whereas CARA seemed 
to have some logical themes in its legislative structure,108 some 
criticized SUPPORT as “scattershot compared with what is 
needed.”109 Legislators noted that the process for developing 
SUPPORT was “rushed,” as the House considered many different 
proposals that were ultimately packaged into a single bill.110 
House Energy and Commerce then-Ranking Member, Frank 
Pallone, worried that many of the bills that would ultimately 
become the foundation of SUPPORT lacked meaningful review: 
Due to the rushed timeline, many of these bills are works in progress 
and are still in discussion draft form. These forced time constraints 
mean that some bills suffer from lack of technical assistance from our 
federal agencies or a [fiscal] analysis. Additionally, and equally 
important, stakeholders have not had the opportunity to adequately 
evaluate these bills or weigh in on their impact.111  
Generally, proponents grouped SUPPORT’s provisions into 
“four buckets: advancing treatment and recovery initiatives, 
improving prevention, protecting our communities, and bolstering 
efforts to fight deadly illicit synthetic drugs such as fentanyl.”112 
 
 105 Maggie Haberman & Robert Pear, Trump Tells Congress to Repeal and Replace 
Health Care Law ‘Very Quickly’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
01/10/us/repeal-affordable-care-act-donald-trump.html [http://perma.cc/GPY8-4MBG]. 
 106 See Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times, 
NEWSWEEK (July 29, 2017, 6:53 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-bill-repeal-
and-replace-70-failed-attempts-643832 [http://perma.cc/V43T-BL4C] (noting that Trump 
called on Senate Republicans via Twitter to continue to push forward on repeal efforts). 
 107 Abby Goodnough, In Rare Bipartisan Accord, House and Senate Reach Compromise on 
Opioid Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/health/opioid-bill-
congress.html [http://perma.cc/H9PK-5JLB] (quoting a researcher who stated, “Compared to 
how we responded to AIDS, it’s a failure,” but that Congress “didn’t want to spend, so they 
agreed on every second-tier issue they could”). During the legislative debate, Ranking Member 
Rep. Pallone noted, “The reality is that meaningful policy in this space may cost money, and 
agreement on appropriate offsets that do not harm people—including the very people that we 
may be trying to help—is a critical component needed in order for me to support these bills 
moving forward.” Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone’s Opening Remarks at Health Subcommittee 
Markup of Opioid Legislation, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. (Apr. 25, 2018), 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/pallone-s-opening-remarks-at-
health-subcommittee-markup-of-opioid [http://perma.cc/XSL8-FUXF]. 
 108 CADCA, supra note 87. 
 109 Goodnough, supra note 107. 
 110 Pallone, supra note 107 (Pallone noted that the committee was considering at least 
sixty-three bills in “the Chairman’s extremely hasty timeframe to pass opioid legislation”). 
 111 Id.  
 112 Greg Walden, Thanks to Congress, we’re making real progress in the opioid crisis, 
WASH. EXAMINER (June 22, 2019, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-
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3. Funding for the Opioid Response 
It is worth discussing further how Congress funded the 
legislative response, given that the failure to create sustainable 
streams of funding for opioid recovery was a criticism of both 
CARA and SUPPORT. While some reforms had little or no fiscal 
impact, others would require a substantial investment of funding 
in order to be effective.113 
As aforementioned, most of CARA and SUPPORT used 
authorizations and did not provide mandatory funding. Following 
the passage of CARA, Congress included $500 million in grants 
to states for both federal fiscal years 2017 and 2018114 to 
supplement their efforts to address opioid abuse as part of the 
21st Century Cures Act.115 Subsequently, Congress agreed to 
provide $6 billion in funding as part of an informal deal to pass a 
larger budget compromise.116 These monies, though, would be 
allocated through the annual appropriations process.117 
Relatedly, both CARA and SUPPORT were passed after 
Republicans attempted to repeal the ACA, which in itself plays a 
 
eds/thanks-to-congress-were-making-real-progress-in-the-opioid-crisis [http://perma.cc/T4CE-
GTCV] (writing, in an editorial, an overview of SUPPORT). But see Zezima & Itkowitz, 
supra note 73 (discussing congressional failures to recognize the increasing dangers of the 
synthetic opioid fentanyl).  
 113 Felter, supra note 67. 
 114 A federal fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 of the following year. 
U.S. SENATE, Glossary Term: Fiscal Year, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal 
_year.htm [http://perma.cc/EMW6-TXS4]. 
 115 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). For more on 
this law, see Ornstein, supra note 85. 
 116 See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (The 
$6 billion commitment—$3 billion for federal fiscal years 2018 and 2019—was a promise 
by Senate leadership); see also Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, FIRST FOCUS (Feb. 2018), 
http://firstfocus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/BBA2018-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
[http://perma.cc/LXU8-DU43] (“To ease passage of the BBA, Senate leadership committed 
to several funding priorities . . . including . . . $6 billion in additional funding for 
combatting the opioid substance abuse epidemic.”). 
 117 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018) 
(shortly after the Bipartisan Budget Act’s passage, the federal fiscal year 2018 was passed into 
law). “The FY 2018 appropriations bill allocated more than $4.65 billion across agencies to help 
states and local governments in their efforts toward prevention, treatment and law 
enforcement initiatives. That represents a $3 billion increase over 2017 spending levels.” For 
an accounting of how these monies were allocated in the first year of implementation, see 
Holland & Knight, Memorandum: Opioid Crisis Proposals and Funding (Apr. 9, 2018), 
http://www.hklaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Alerts/HealthcareLifeandSciences/040918
HealthcareMemoOpioidCrisisProposalsandFunding.pdf [http://perma.cc/B6UG-MW8H]; German 
Lopez, Congress’s omnibus bill adds $3.3 billion to fight the opioid crisis. It’s not enough., VOX 
(Mar. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/22/17150294/ 
congress-omnibus-bill-opioid-epidemic [http://perma.cc/CDU8-4XAJ]; Tracking Federal 
Funding to Combat the Opioid Crisis, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 2019), 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Tracking-Federal-Funding-to-Combat-
the-Opioid-Crisis.pdf [http://perma.cc/6JLZ-BLFK].  
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major role in providing financial support and coverage for 
treating opioid misuse and other addictions.118 These pivots 
suggest moving away from a fight that had grown unpopular 
with the broader electorate,119 but also an attempt to push 
forward reforms on the cheap.120 Had the ACA been repealed and 
replaced in its entirety, it would have created havoc for many 
initiatives attempting to fight the opioid epidemic and provide 
treatment to those suffering from opioid addiction.121 Several 
wavering Senators requested that additional funding, specifically 
for addressing the opioid epidemic, would be included in a repeal 
proposal, but ACA supporters argued such funds would not be 
 
 118 Kendal Orgera & Jennifer Tolbert, The Opioid Epidemic and Medicaid’s Role in 
Facilitating Access to Treatment, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 24, 2019), 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-opioid-epidemic-and-medicaids-role-in-facilitating-
access-to-treatment [http://perma.cc/6PZA-48RL] (Of the “nearly two million nonelderly adults in 
the United States [who] had an opioid use disorder (OUD) . . . nearly four in ten were covered by 
Medicaid”). Note that some conservatives believe that the ACA and its Medicaid expansion helped 
cause the opioid epidemic. See Majority Staff Report of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t 
Affairs, Drugs for Dollars: How Medicaid Helps Fuel the Opioid Epidemic, Executive Summary 2 
(2018), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-01-17%20Drugs%20for%20Dollars%20 
How%20Medicaid%20Helps%20Fuel%20the%20Opioid%20Epidemic.pdf [http://perma.cc/TY7Z-
MBUL]; see also Nicholas Eberstadt, Our Miserable 21st Century, COMMENTARY (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/our-miserable-21st-century [http://perma.cc/DJ25-
XQSH] (declaring it “incontrovertible” that “Medicaid inadvertently helped finance America’s 
immense and increasing appetite for opioids in our new century”). Others, however, argue that 
there is little data to support such a conclusion:  
First, trends in opioid deaths nationally and by Medicaid expansion status 
predate the ACA. Second, counties with the largest coverage gains actually 
experienced smaller increases in drug-related mortality than counties with 
smaller coverage gains. Third, the fact that Medicaid recipients fill more opioid 
prescriptions than non-recipients largely reflects greater levels of disability 
and chronic illness in the populations that Medicaid serves. 
Andrew Goodman-Bacon & Emma Sandoe, Did Medicaid Expansion Cause The Opioid 
Epidemic? There’s Little Evidence That It Did., HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 23, 2017), 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170823.061640/full/ 
[http://perma.cc/4FCZ-S6GM]. 
 119 Ashley Kirzinger et al., KAISER FAM. FOUND., 6 Charts About Public Opinion On The 
Affordable Care Act, RAMAON HEALTHCARE (July 19, 2019), http://ramaonhealthcare.com/6-
charts-about-public-opinion-on-the-affordable-care-act/ [http://perma.cc/5KFN-8BTB] (“During 
Republican efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA) during the summer of 2017, KFF 
Health Tracking Polls began to find a slight uptick in overall favorability towards the 2010 
health care law.”). 
 120 Goodnough, supra note 107. 
 121 Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Trump administration undermines 
anti-opioid efforts by opposing Obamacare, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2019), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2019/03/28/the-health-
202-trump-administration-undermines-anti-opioid-efforts-by-opposing-obamacare/5c9ba06f1b3
26b0f7f38f28a/?noredirect=on [http://perma.cc/2H7G-2CZK] (noting that a repeal of the ACA 
would “endanger the [federal government]’s anti-opioids effort by leaving around 25 million 
Americans without health coverage and removing the law’s requirements for insurers to cover 
substance abuse services as part of 10 essential health benefits”). 
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sufficient to make up for a repeal of the ACA.122 The major repeal 
proposals would have restructured Medicaid,123 and many 
opponents of this effort argued that it would have resulted in a 
cut to safety-net, public-funded behavioral health programs and 
other state initiatives.124 The Medicaid program, which provides 
federal matching dollars for state health services for low-income 
adults, provides the financial foundation for many substance 
misuse disorder programs.125 Additionally, opponents of the 
repeal noted that eliminating the ACA would strike its 
requirement that substance abuse treatment be considered an 
essential benefit, as well as protect consumers from being 
discriminated against for having a pre-existing condition, such as 
a substance misuse disorder.126 
B. Criminal Justice Reform: FIRST STEP 
In recent years, pundits have highlighted shifts in how some 
policymakers—particularly conservative ones—have approached 
criminal-justice issues and how the electorate has responded.127 
At the federal level, a meaningful attempt to address some of the 
punitive measures from the amended CSA took shape in 2015 
 
 122 Dylan Scott, More opioid funding won’t save the Senate health care bill, VOX 
(June 29, 2017, 5:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/29/15895906/ 
voxcare-bcra-opioid-funding-capito [http://perma.cc/T2R7-27HB] (noting that one key 
Senator requested $45 billion in specific funding for the opioid epidemic). 
 123 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMPARISON OF THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ACT 
(AHCA) AND THE BETTER CARE RECONCILIATION ACT (BCRA), 11–22 (2017), 
http://crsreportscongress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44883 [http://perma.cc/C9AT-RRM6]. 
 124 Marianna Sotomayor, Trump signs sweeping opioid bill with vote to end ‘scourge’ 
of drug addiction, NBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2018, 1:51 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
politics/congress/trump-signs-sweeping-opioid-bill-vow-end-scourge-drug-addiction-n923976 
[http://perma.cc/L9UF-AWFY] (quoting Pallone regarding SUPPORT, that it would be 
“disingenuous at best to promise relief to people struggling with opioid addiction while also 
attempting to cut funding for Medicaid and eliminate protections for people with pre-existing 
conditions, which include opioid use disorder”). 
 125 Orgera & Tolbert, supra note 118. 
 126 Reed Abelson et al., What Happens if Obamacare Is Struck Down?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/health/obamacare-trump-health.html 
[http://perma.cc/A2K6-US4N]. 
 127 Timothy Williams & Thomas Kaplan, The Criminal Justice Debate Has Changed 
Drastically. Here’s Why., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/us/ 
politics/criminal-justice-reform-sanders-warren.html [http://perma.cc/N56G-Q7MD] (discussing 
how previously “radical” ideas were being debated as part of the Democratic presidential 
nomination campaign due to “a seismic shift in how the American public views criminal justice 
issues,” but likely to be “used by President Trump and his allies to tar whoever becomes the 
Democratic nominee”). Additionally, several reforms have occurred at the state level, such as 
restoring voting rights in purple states, like Virginia and Florida. See id. (discussing a 
California initiative limiting the use of deadly force); see also Victoria Shineman, Florida 
restores voting rights to 1.5 million citizens, which might also decrease crime, CONVERSATION 
(Nov. 7, 2018, 2:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/florida-restores-voting-rights-to-1-5-
million-citizens-which-might-also-decrease-crime-106528 [http://perma.cc/NK4R-P5BX]. 
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when a key Republican, the Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck 
Grassley, agreed to introduce bipartisan legislation to reform 
federal sentencing laws.128 But there was skepticism whether 
reform efforts would continue after the 2016 election ushered in 
the Trump Administration and a more conservative Congress.129 
Although polling found general public support for reforming 
federal sentencing laws for drug convictions,130 the issue did not 
seem to have the same overt public outcry from the general 
public as addressing the opioid epidemic.131 
An unusual coalition of disparate interests were able to 
maintain momentum for criminal justice reforms in the next 
Congress.132 These key discrete constituencies in the unusual 
political coalition provided the political cover necessary to 
overcome the “law and order” resistance against the modest 
 
 128 See Antonio Ginatta, Dispatches: Strange Bedfellows for US Criminal Justice 
Reform, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 1, 2015, 5:09 PM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/01/ 
dispatches-strange-bedfellows-us-criminal-justice-reform [http://perma.cc/YM94-AR8L]. 
 129 See Miriam S. Gohara, Keep on Keeping On: Maintaining Momentum for Criminal 
Justice Reform During the Trump Era, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 1 (2018), http://law.stanford.edu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Gohara-05.28.18.pdf [http://perma.cc/N98T-RXZM]; see 
also Bill Keller, How Criminal Justice Reform Died, VICE (Sept. 28, 2016, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yvewn7/how-criminal-justice-reform-died-bill-keller 
[http://perma.cc/DVL4-CATT] (discussing political campaigning during the 2016 election 
cycle and partisan concerns about giving the outgoing Obama Administration a victory); 
see also Carl Hulse, Why the Senate Couldn’t Pass a Crime Bill Both Parties Backed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/senate-dysfunction-
blocks-bipartisan-criminal-justice-overhaul.html [http://perma.cc/MF72-JZJ2] (quoting a 
Republican Senator that the Republican leadership did not want the caucus to seem 
divided on a key issue, as well as noting that then-Republican presidential nominee 
Trump was campaigning on a “tough-on-crime” message). 
 130 See Poll Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Support Prison, Sentencing Reforms, 
COMM. ON JUD. (Aug. 23, 2018), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/poll-shows-
americans-overwhelmingly-support-prison-sentencing-reforms [http://perma.cc/DKC5-UG8C]; 
see also 91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds, 
ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americans-support-
criminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds [http://perma.cc/GT7R-87DR].  
 131 See John Gramlich, Voters’ perception of crime continue to conflict with reality, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/16/voters-
perceptions-of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality [http://perma.cc/AXG3-J4AB] (“Almost 
eight-in-ten voters who supported President-elect Donald Trump (78%) said this, as did 
37% of backers of Democrat Hillary Clinton” and believed that crime worsened between 
2008 and 2016, although “U.S. violent crime and property crime rates fell 19% and 23%, 
respectively,” from 2008 to 2015); see also Little Partisan Agreement on the Pressing Problems 
Facing the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/10/15/little-
partisan-agreement-on-the-pressing-problems-facing-the-u-s [http://perma.cc/LX2A-GW9A] 
(noting that while Democrats and Republicans shared similar views on whether “violent crime 
(49% of Republicans, 47% of Democrats) and drug addiction (67% of Republicans, 64% of 
Democrats)” were priority issues before the 2018 elections, “71% of Democratic voters say the 
way racial and ethnic minorities are treated by the criminal justice system is a very big 
problem for the country, compared with just 10% of Republican voters.”). 
 132 Ray Suarez, Trump’s Push For Prison Reform, ON POINT (May 21, 2018), 
http://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2018/05/21/trump-prison-reform [http://perma.cc/HW4H-3PSQ]. 
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reforms in FIRST STEP.133 For instance, although President 
Trump campaigned134—and continues to campaign135—on a 
hardline message regarding “law and order,” and selected a 
conservative Attorney General known to oppose marijuana 
legalization and other reforms,136 his embrace of FIRST STEP 
helped overcome some Senate Republicans’ reservations of 
supporting it.137 
 
 133 Osita Nwanevu, The Improbable Success of a Criminal-Justice-Reform Bill Under 
Trump, NEW YORKER (Dec. 17, 2018), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-
improbable-success-of-a-criminal-justice-reform-bill-under-trump [http://perma.cc/8LHN-KMEX] 
(“The significant buy-in from the right is the culmination of years of effort from a cadre of 
libertarian-leaning conservatives, like the anti-tax zealot Grover Norquist, and 
evangelicals, such as Chuck Colson, the founder of the Christian nonprofit organization 
Prison Fellowship, who have worked to convince others that the prison system has 
become too costly, punitive, and government-empowering.”). See also Arthur Rizer & Lars 
Trautman, The conservative case for criminal justice reform, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2018, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/05/the-conservative-case-for-criminal-justice-
reform [http://perma.cc/SL6L-7AFW] (arguing why “conservatives must go back to the 
principles of liberty and dignity that first defined their party,” and apply “these principles 
to criminal justice reform”). Key influential conservatives were moved by the massive 
costs for maintaining a vast prison system with seemingly little effect on crime rates, 
SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 279 (noting “the high social costs of mass 
incarceration”), as well as an increasing policy presence—particularly by the federal 
government—that threatened individual liberties. See Criminal Justice Reform, 
CHARLES KOCH INST., http://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justice-
policing-reform/ [http://perma.cc/493E-ECQU]. But see Keller, supra note 129 (arguing 
that the “spectacular mustering of bipartisan solidarity at a time of political 
polarization and paralysis . . . was not nearly as muscular as it seemed”). 
 134 Hulse, supra note 129 (noting that Trump’s 2016 campaign included “warnings of 
a United States at risk from sinister forces, even though violent crime is low compared 
with past decades”). 
 135 Christina Wilkie, Trump praises ‘stop and frisk,’ calls for tougher policing tactics, 
CNBC (Oct. 8, 2018, 4:06 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/08/trump-praises-stop-and-frisk-
calls-for-tougher-policing-tactics.html [http://perma.cc/7J96-DYTW]. In relation to the opioid 
epidemic, Trump seemingly called for the death penalty for drug trafficking. See Ayesha 
Rascoe, How Trump Went From Tough on Crime’ To Second Chance’ For Felons, NPR, 
MORNING EDITION (Dec. 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/12/17/676771335/how-
trump-went-from-tough-on-crime-to-second-chance-for-felons [http://perma.cc/T82Z-HRK5] 
(quoting President Trump as suggesting “at some point, we'll get very smart as a nation and 
give them the ultimate punishment”). 
 136 Jordan Waldrep, What Replacing Jeff Sessions As AG Means For Marijuana 
Legalization, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2018, 8:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanwaldrep/ 
2018/11/13/what-replacing-jeff-sessions-as-ag-means-for-marijuana-legalization/#1a138ae0103f 
[http://perma.cc/2DAG-7J2K]. Most notably, during his tenure, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
reversed the so-called Cole memo, which was guidance issued under the Obama Administration 
that permitted U.S. Attorneys to focus resources away from marijuana prosecutions in states 
where its use was permitted. See THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2. 
 137 Gohara, supra note 129. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, whose father had served 
time in federal prison, is often credited for pushing Trump to support FIRST STEP. Rascoe, supra 
note 135. Trump’s embrace of FIRST STEP has led subsequently to strange confrontations over 
credit for its passage. See Jacey Fortin, Trump Insults Chrissy Teigen and John Legend, and They 
Fire Back, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/us/chrissy-teigen-
trump-twitter.html [http://perma.cc/N239-Q6RZ]. 
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Despite this confluence of support, the legislative debate 
over FIRST STEP was quite divisive and reflective of different 
positions within conservative philosophy.138 Passed shortly after 
SUPPORT and in the “lame duck” session following the midterm 
elections,139 FIRST STEP represented a series of compromises, 
again paralleling some of the compromises between the Nixon 
Administration and the Democratic Congress over the CSA.140 
One of the bill’s Senate Republican sponsors even suggested 
revising the bill’s sentencing reforms to make it more palatable 
to opposing Senators.141 Such revisions included a new 
mechanism for allowing early release, a look at who would be 
eligible to participate in early release,142 and what penalties were 
appropriate for drug offenses.143 Senator Tom Cotton, a 
Republican from Arkansas and the lead opponent of FIRST 
STEP, argued that the bill’s proponents were incorrect in their 
public statements as to how the bill would actually work.144 In a 
series of opinion pieces outlining his opposition,145 Cotton argued 
that the bill would allow a larger segment of felons than the 
proponents described to be able to seek early release.146 Cotton 
 
 138 Everett & Haberkorn, supra note 97. Given the limited window for debate on the 
Senate floor, Senate leaders are generally reluctant to bring up bills that divide their 
caucus and could delay other competing legislative priorities. Burgess Everett & Elana 
Schor, Cotton wields sex offender report to tank prisons bill, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:26 
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/26/tom-cotton-criminal-justice-reform-senate-
republicans-trump-1015149 [http://perma.cc/HE92-RLEV]. Further, in this particular 
situation, it was likely that the Senate would pass a bill different than what the House 
had passed earlier in the legislative session, and because a number of House Republicans 
were retiring or had been defeated in the 2018 election, it could be difficult to convince the 
House to remain in session to take up a new bill. Id. 
 139 Burgess Everett & Elana Schor, Criminal justice reform bill still alive as McConnell 
deliberates, POLITICO (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:12 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/29/congress-
criminal-justice-reform-senate-mcconnell-1032469 [http://perma.cc/XYU9-7QC3]. 
 140 See supra notes 21–57. 
 141 Elana Schor, Criminal justice deal faces steep Senate hurdles despite Trump’s push, 
POLITICO (Aug. 17, 2018, 5:08 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/17/senate-criminal-
justice-deal-trump-781876 [http://perma.cc/2N8F-KCWS] (quoting Senator John Cornyn, “The 
sentencing reform stuff begins to divide people, including the administration.”). 
 142 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5193, 5196–98 (2018) 
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3632).  
 143 Id. at 5220–21.  
 144 Tom Cotton, What’s Really in Congress’s Justice-Reform Bill, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 26, 
2018, 10:48 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/first-step-criminal-justice-reform-
bill-whats-in-it/ [http://perma.cc/VHV7-RWVP].  
 145 See id.; see also Tom Cotton, Lame-duck Congress’ rush for criminal justice reform 
plan will hurt, not help, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2018, 9:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/opinion/2018/11/15/tom-cotton-congresss-criminal-justice-reform-bill-opioids-laws-
column/2003829002/ [http://perma.cc/C4LY-2B26]. 
 146 Cotton, supra note 144. For a response to Cotton’s argument that many early-released 
prisoners will commit felonies subsequently, see Zak Cheney-Rice, Tom Cotton’s America Is Not a 
Free America, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Dec. 13, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/toms-
cotton-first-step-act.html [http://perma.cc/C3YF-3RWF] (noting that Cotton’s arguments do not 
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also attacked granting federal judges more discretion to ignore 
mandatory minimum sentences for those with prior criminal 
records.147 Lastly, Cotton invoked the opioid epidemic at least 
twice: he noted that “[m]ore than 90 percent of traffickers [of 
heroin and fentanyl] will be eligible for the time credits” toward 
an early release, and he argued that the bill would result in a 
repeat fentanyl trafficker potentially serving half of the prison 
sentence than would be required under current law.148 
In response, Senator Mike Lee, a Republican from Utah, 
defended FIRST STEP in a parallel editorial.149 Lee noted that 
certain federal inmates could seek “pre-release custody—meaning 
home confinement, supervised release, or a halfway house.”150 Lee 
reiterated that the bill explicitly would exclude certain categories 
of offenders, and only allows inmates to seek the new credits 
created by FIRST STEP if they are at a minimum or low risk of 
recidivism.151 Whereas Cotton argued that this determination of 
recidivism was too reliant on “government bureaucrats” and 
could be gamed by a future administration,152 Lee responded that the 
determinations would be made by “experienced law-enforcement 
officers.”153 Lee also noted that FIRST STEP only granted discretion 
for federal judges to ignore mandatory minimums in limited 
circumstances; for instance, such discretion would not be available in 
cases where defendants “used or threatened violence or possessed a 
 
distinguish between those in federal versus state prison, and thus incorrectly account for those 
“locked up for drug offenses” and recidivism rates). 
 147 Cotton, supra note 144. 
 148 Id.; see also Zezima & Itkowitz, supra note 73 (discussing how Senate leadership 
decided not to bring up a bill for consideration that would increase the sentence for 
fentanyl trafficking because of concerns that it “would clash with the effort and possibly 
imperil the bill’s [FIRST STEP’s] passage”). 
 149 Mike Lee, The Truth about the FIRST STEP Act, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:05 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/the-truth-about-the-first-step-act/ 
[http://perma.cc/VS48-EW6C]. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee disputed Cotton’s arguments 
related to FIRST STEP’s treatment of sex offenders. See Everett & Schor, supra note 138 
(referring to a committee spokesperson who distinguished between credits for good behavior 
under current law and changes made by FIRST STEP); see also Summary of the Revised 
First Step Act, infra note 156 (“Original text of the bill already excluded sex offenders.”).  
 152 Cotton, supra note 144 (“But this requires extraordinary faith in the government’s 
ability to predict the recidivism risk of violent felons. . . . But it is surprising to me that 
conservatives, and especially libertarians, have faith that government bureaucrats can 
judge the state of a felon’s soul and predict his future behavior. Even if you trusted the 
current administration to do so, would you trust a future Democratic administration?”). 
 153 Lee, supra note 149; see also Salvador Rizzo, Does the sentencing bill give early release to 
drug traffickers, sex offenders?, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2018/11/30/does-sentencing-bill-give-early-release-drug-traffickers-sex-offenders/ 
[http://perma.cc/2E3D-2U8F] (discussing the “objective criteria and a point system to assess risk” 
used by the Bureau of Prisons). 
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firearm or other dangerous weapon, or if their offense resulted in 
serious bodily injury or death.”154 Finally, Lee disputed Cotton’s 
determination of the time a fentanyl dealer would serve and the 
amount of qualifying activities such felons could participate in to 
reduce their sentences.155 
In the end though, the Senate adopted an amendment to 
FIRST STEP that addressed several of Cotton’s and other 
opponents’ arguments.156 Although Cotton and his allies voted 
against FIRST STEP, it overwhelmingly passed the Senate157 and 
then was agreed to by the House.158 
III. MARIJUANA IN THE SHADOW OF THE CSA 
As Congress has debated responses to the opioid epidemic 
and whether to reform federal sentencing for drug offenses, there 
has been a related debate has been over the treatment of 
marijuana. Legalization of marijuana is seemingly popular with 
the electorate, and some policymakers have called for its 
legalization for medical purposes, and sometimes even 
recreational use, as well as forgiveness for prior drug offenses 
related to marijuana. Yet, even while change is happening 
rapidly at the state level, marijuana remains criminalized by the 
fifty-year-old CSA. This section will explore the movement at the 
state level toward legalization of marijuana, the failure to amend 
the CSA, and the conflict between state and federal law. 
A. State Activity on Marijuana 
As discussed previously, the federal government often plays 
a leadership role in influencing and standardizing states’ 
criminal laws.159 For instance, when the CSA became law, the 
Nixon Administration promoted a Uniform Controlled Substances 
 
 154 Lee, supra note 149. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See CONG. REC. (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2018) (Sen. McConnell proposing an 
amendment to S. 756); see also Summary of the Revised First Step Act, SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Revised%20First%20Step%20Act%20-%20Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/EV3W-9CTA]. In 
order to move quickly through the legislative process, the Senate amended an unrelated bill 
that had already passed the House with the modified version of FIRST STEP. In response, the 
House voted on a motion to concur with this Senate amendment, allowing the bill to move to 
the President for signature. Summary: S. 756 (115th): S. 756: FIRST Step Act, GOVTRACK, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s756/summary [http://perma.cc/B4DP-NT6N] (last 
updated Dec. 18, 2018). 
 157 U.S. S. ROLL CALL VOTE 271, 115th Cong., 2nd Session (passing 87 to 12). 
 158 U.S. HOUSE ROLL CALL VOTE 448, 115th Cong., 2nd Session (passing 358 to 36). 
 159 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 234–35. 
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Act that eventually was adopted by the states.160 Although several 
politicians in the 1960s adopted a tough-on-crime message to 
capitalize on a general concern about disorder,161 a public health 
approach to drug addiction also emerged as a competing policy 
option to criminalization.162 Additionally, increasing use of 
marijuana created some public skepticism about criminalizing 
drugs.163 Thus, as aforementioned, advocates for each of these 
different policy options were able to find compromise in the initial 
CSA, but subsequently, policymakers amended the CSA and made 
other policy decisions that favored criminalization and interdiction 
over a public health approach to drug issues.164 
Advocates for reform, particularly for marijuana reform, 
looked for other avenues, such as popular referendums, as a 
means of bypassing resistant legislative majorities.165 The first 
success was in California: after several legislative failures, 
advocates petitioned for a referendum on legalizing marijuana for 
medical purposes.166 Advocates focused on the belief that 
marijuana could provide relief for those with terminal illnesses 
such as HIV and cancer.167 Ultimately, in 1996, the referendum, 
Proposition 215, successfully passed 55% to 44%, making 
California the first state to legalize medical marijuana.168 
Subsequently, thirty-two more states and the District of Columbia 
have legalized medical marijuana, either through ballot initiatives 
or by traditional legislation.169 
Building on these successes, advocates have turned toward 
legalizing marijuana for recreational or “adult” use, and time 
will tell if this movement is as successful as efforts to allow for 
 
 160 See id. (“Today, every U.S. state has passed this legislation [the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act], ensuring that the federal government sets the terms of drug control.”). 
 161 Id. at 254–56. 
 162 Id. at 235 (discussing the “emerging influence of the mental health profession [as] 
an alternative approach to the problem of narcotics”); Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 157 
(discussing how “mental health professionals responsible for treating addicts gained a 
voice in policy debates”). 
 163 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 235 (“[W]idespread use of marijuana and 
narcotics created a reality that undermined [federal officials’] horror stories about 
them.”); Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 157. 
 164 It remains to be seen whether CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP, supra Part III, 
signify a divergence from this course or a temporary aberration.  
 165 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 163. 
 166 Id. at 163–65. 
 167 Id. at 167–68. 
 168 Proposition 215, printed in Cal. Sec’y State, California Ballot Pamphlet: General 
Election November 5, 1996, at 58 (1996). 
 169 State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Sept. 27, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/9CBM-CEPH]. 
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medical marijuana. In 2012, voters in Colorado170 and 
Washington171 passed ballot initiatives, making the two states 
the first to legalize marijuana for adult-use purposes. 
Subsequently, Alaska,172 California,173 Illinois,174 Maine,175 
Massachusetts,176 Michigan,177 Nevada,178 Oregon,179 and 
Vermont,180 adopted adult-use policies, often with the 
expectation of raising state revenues while hoping to reduce 
enforcement efforts. 
In addition to the divergence between medical and recreational 
use of marijuana, the approach used in each state toward 
legalization—particularly for recreational use—has varied as well.181 
 
 170 COLO. CONST. amend. 64. A prior amendment, that would have decriminalized 
marijuana in 2006, had failed. Colorado Votes In Favor Of Pot Legalization, CBSDENVER 
(Nov. 6, 2012, 11:56 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2012/11/06/no-on-64-concedes-colorado-
votes-in-favor-of-pot-legalization/ [http://perma.cc/C3LH-FWN3].  
 171 Initiative Measure 502 (Wash. 2012). 
 172 A Summary of Measure 2, An Act to Tax and Regulate the use of Marijuana, 
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/alaska/a-summary-of-measure-2-an-
act-to-tax-and-regulate-the-production-sale-and-use-of-marijuana/ [http://perma.cc/RJ7W-RDUP] 
(discussing successful 2014 ballot measure).  
 173 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550.5(a)(3) (West 2019) (explaining that AUMA, under the 
initiative Prop. 215, was enacted into the state legislature). 
 174 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705 (West 2019). Illinois is the first state to approve 
legal sales through the state legislature rather than a ballot measure. 
 175 As retail stores open across the state, regulators consider delivery, social consumption 
rules, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 12, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/maine/ 
[http://perma.cc/3W5U-S7HE] (discussing successful 2016 ballot measure and the delays 
in implementation). 
 176 Historic victory: The 2016 Yes on 4 Campaign, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 12, 
2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/massachusetts/ [http://perma.cc/69SH-HNA6] (discussing 
successful 2012 ballot measure). 
 177 Marijuana Regulatory Agency publishes emergency rules to implement legalization, 
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (July 22, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/michigan/ 
[http://perma.cc/NFE-QCBF] (discussing successful 2018 ballot measure). 
 178 States increasingly looking to Nevada as a model, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Nov. 5, 
2018), http://www.mpp.org/states/nevada/ [http://perma.cc/VY55-38YQ] (discussing successful 
2016 ballot measure). 
 179 The Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act: A 
Summary of Measure 91, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/oregon/ 
summary-of-oregons-measure-91/ [http://perma.cc/R9FH-2AMD] (discussing successful 
2014 ballot measure). 
 180 Vermont became the first state to decriminalize, by legislation, the adult-use of 
marijuana by decriminalizing possession and limited cultivation of cannabis by adults 
twenty-one and older. See Vermonters enjoy legal home-grown cannabis; bill to regulate 
retail sales passes Senate—House to take up bill in early 2020, MARIJUANA POL’Y 
PROJECT (May 28, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/vermont/ [http://perma.cc/4MUY-9YSW]. 
However, this state law did not set up a regulatory system for sales or production. Wilson 
Ring, Vermont, New Hampshire Both Could Delay Marijuana Proposals, CBS BOSTON 
(May 18, 2019, 2:35 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2019/05/18/vermont-new-hampshire-
could-delay-recreational-marijuana-proposals/ [http://perma.cc/9J78-GSB2]. 
 181 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 149 (“The growing willingness of policy entrepreneurs 
to invoke the initiative process may heighten political conflict between federal and state 
institutions and actors with divergent policy priorities.”). 
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Despite the apparent popularity of marijuana legalization,182 most 
states’ legalization process came through ballot initiatives, not 
through legislation.183 This difference is even starker in efforts 
around recreational marijuana. Of the states that have legalized 
recreational use, only Illinois184 and Vermont185 have done so via 
the legislative process, with high-profile legislative failures in the 
politically liberal states of Connecticut,186 New Jersey,187 New 
Mexico,188 and New York.189 While some opposition focused on 
oft-cited concerns about criminal activity, other political concerns 
included the impact on low-income communities and whether these 
communities would see the economic benefits of legalization.190 
 
 182 Hartig & Geiger, supra note 13. 
 183 A referendum, however, failed in North Dakota that would have legalized 
marijuana for adult use and expunged prior offenses automatically. North Dakota 
Measure 3, Marijuana Legalization and Automatic Expungement Initiative (2018), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Measure_3,_Marijuana_Legalization_ 
and_Automatic_Expungement_Initiative_(2018) [http://perma.cc/DY6Q-YXX2]. 
 184 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705 (West 2019). 
 185 Ring, supra note 180 (discussing how Vermont had decriminalized recreational 
use of marijuana, but had not yet passed a scheme for regulating such use).  
 186 Ryan Holz, Connecticut Joins Other Northeast States in Failing to Pass Recreational 
Marijuana Legislation in 2019, JD SUPRA (June 14, 2019), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
connecticut-joins-other-northeast-97789/ [http://perma.cc/QDY8-PTMD]. 
 187 Ryan Hutchins et al., Legal pot bill dead: New Jersey lawmakers to move ahead 
with 2020 referendum, POLITICO (May 15, 2019, 11:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/ 
new-jersey/story/2019/05/15/marijuana-bill-dead-new-jersey-lawmakers-to-move-forward-with-
referendum-1017330 [http://perma.cc/5FCC-CLZ4]. 
 188 N.M. MUT., Recreational marijuana use in New Mexico could pass in 2020. Will your 
business be ready?, ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (June 1, 2019), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
albuquerque/news/2019/06/01/recreational-marijuana-use-in-new-mexico-could.html 
[http://perma.cc/Z675-NSWT]. 
 189 Joseph Spector & Jon Campbell, Why legalizing marijuana in New York 
failed, but decriminalizing it passed, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (June 21, 2019, 8:20 AM), 
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2019/06/21/why-legalizing-
pot-new-york-failed-but-decriminalizing-passed/1521505001/ [http://perma.cc/5Z6T-TUGE]. 
 190 Vivian Wang, Final Push to Legalize Pot Fails in New York, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/nyregion/marijuana-legalization-ny.html?module=inline 
[http://perma.cc/6GWS-L8QK] (finding that suburban state senators might not have 
voted for the bill); Nick Corasaniti, Effort to Legalize Marijuana in New Jersey 
Collapses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/nyregion/new-
jersey-marijuana.html [http://perma.cc/Z2TL-K38D] (noting that lawmakers were concerned 
about the public health impact on minority communities and “challenges faced by other 
states that have legalized cannabis, including how to keep the drug away from 
teenagers and prevent people from driving under its influence”); Vivian Wang & Jeffery 
C. Mays, Black Lawmakers to Block Legalized Marijuana in N.Y. if Their Communities 
Don’t Benefit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/ 
nyregion/marijuana-legalization-african-americans.html?action=click&module=Related 
Links&pgtype=Article [http://perma.cc/B6MZ-CKQD] (noting that black legislators in New 
York would withhold support for an adult-use legislation bill unless they were “assured that 
some of that money will go toward job training programs, and that minority entrepreneurs will 
receive licenses to cultivate or sell the marijuana”). 
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B. Recent Federal Activity on Marijuana to Amend the CSA 
In contrast to tremendous state activity following the 
California ballot initiative, little has changed in regard to 
marijuana at the federal level since the CSA passed some fifty 
years ago.191 The following subsection will provide a brief 
overview of federal actions, with a particular focus on federal 
enforcement of the CSA. 
Although several high-profile members of Congress have 
introduced legislation on marijuana,192 there has been little 
movement on these proposals in either the Democratic-controlled 
House or Republican-controlled Senate.193 The issue gaining 
attention in the 116th Congress is providing a “safe harbor” for 
financial institutions to do business with state-licensed 
marijuana companies and related providers.194 The House passed 
the Secure And Fair Enforcement (“SAFE”) Banking Act,195 while 
the Senate Banking Committee is considering marking up the 
same or similar legislation.196 Some advocates, however, have 
 
 191 When a majority of states adopt a similar position—even if that position is in contrast 
to federal law—it can provide political cover for federal policymakers to amend federal law to 
be consistent with the states. Kim, supra note 16, at 94 (noting how state right-to-try laws 
helped usher a change to federal regulations around access to experimental drugs). 
 192 Justin Strekal, 4/20: Will Congress advance marijuana legislation in 2019? HILL 
(Apr. 20, 2019, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/439806-4-20-will-congress-
advance-marijuana-legislation-in-2019 [http://perma.cc/9HWV-KZVF] (“As of this writing, 
members of Congress have introduced five separate bills to end the federal prohibition of 
marijuana. In addition, there are also more than half a dozen bills pending before Congress 
that seek to restrain the federal enforcement of cannabis prohibition in states that have 
reformed their marijuana laws.”). 
 193 See, e.g., Caitlyn Kim, After Years of Stalemate, Federal Cannabis Legislation Finds 
Traction in Congress, CPR (July 22, 2019), http://www.cpr.org/2019/07/22/after-years-of-
stalemate-federal-cannabis-legislation-finds-traction-in-congress/ [http://perma.cc/EY8C-
CPW5]. The Marijuana Policy Project lists a dozen bills—with several having bipartisan 
support—in the current 116th Congress. See Several marijuana-related bills filed in new 
Congress, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Sept. 25, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/policy/federal/ 
[http://perma.cc/5PR4-DUXJ]. 
 194 Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 617, 620 (2016) (“In addition, anyone conspiring with or aiding and abetting those 
violating federal law are equally liable for a violation of federal law. This includes, at least 
in principle, anyone leasing space to marijuana businesses, working for or contracting 
with them, or providing basic services such as accounting, banking, financial, and legal 
services.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 195 H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019) (passing the House by a vote of 321 to 103). 
 196 Zachary Warmbrodt, Crapo plans landmark cannabis banking vote, POLITICO 
(Sept. 13, 2019, 5:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/13/crapo-cannabis-
banking-vote-1729925 [http://perma.cc/5GHD-J7NM] (noting the committee chairman’s 
interest “because of questions surrounding transactions with other businesses, like 
plumbers and hardware stores, that provide services to the marijuana industry”). Notably, 
Senator Mike Crapo of Idaho, the Banking Committee Chairman, represents a state that 
does not allow for either medical or recreational marijuana. 2020 medical marijuana ballot 
petition approved for circulation, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 15, 2019), 
http://www.mpp.org/states/idaho/ [http://perma.cc/8KMU-8G2T]. 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:52 AM 
2020] Original Intent 155 
raised concerns about addressing the financial issues of the 
marijuana industry without also addressing some of the systemic 
issues caused by the federal criminalization of marijuana.197 
Congress has also intervened in the federal enforcement of 
the CSA. Given the supremacy of federal law, the Supreme Court 
has held that state legalization does not prohibit federal 
enforcement of the CSA, even on wholly intrastate activities, 
such as a patient growing a small amount of marijuana for 
personal consumption.198 After receiving criticism on its policy on 
marijuana prosecutions,199 the Obama Administration issued 
guidance in 2013 to federal prosecutors to exercise their 
discretion whether to prosecute marijuana cases in states with a 
robust regulatory system for legalized uses of marijuana.200 
Subsequently in 2014, Congress included an amendment in an 
appropriations bill that prohibited the Justice Department from 
prosecuting those involved in state medical marijuana 
initiatives.201 So far, Congress has continued to include the same 
funding restriction in the annual appropriations bill for the 
Justice Department. 
IV. POLITICAL REALISM: LOOKING AT WHY MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION HAS FAILED AND ITS LESSONS 
As discussed, given the changing attitudes toward drug policy 
and criminal justice, the changing state landscape on marijuana, 
and the popularity of legalizing it (at least medical purposes), it 
would seem that the time would be ripe for Congress to respond by 
amending the CSA, particularly in the Democratic-controlled 
House. Indeed, a key committee chairman claimed that marijuana 
legalization would be one of the first items on the majority’s 
agenda,202 but a month later, the Republican ranking member of 
 
 197 See Natalie Fertig et al., Advocates ask Pelosi, Hoyer to press pause on cannabis 
banking, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2019, 5:47 AM), http://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-
cannabis-preview/2019/09/18/advocates-ask-pelosi-hoyer-to-press-pause-on-cannabis-banking-
478449 [http://perma.cc/4JTP-FFH9]; see also Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et 
al., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, and Steny Hoyer, Majority 
Leader, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 17, 2019), http://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016d-
41d0-db25-a77d-5fd3acdc0000 [http://perma.cc/YVV5-72WW]. 
 198 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005). 
 199 Kamin, supra note 194, at 628–30 (discussing initial inconsistencies in the Obama 
Justice Department toward prosecution of marijuana cases). 
 200 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. to U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013). 
 201 The amendment passed the House by a 219 to 189 vote on May 30, 2014, and was 
subsequently included in Section 538 of Division B (Commerce-Justice-Science) of the 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 P.L. 113–235. 
 202 Kyle Jaeger, House Will Vote To End Federal Marijuana Prohibition Within ‘Weeks,’ 
Key Chairman Says, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Mar. 27, 2019), http://www.marijuanamoment.net/ 
house-will-vote-to-end-federal-marijuana-prohibition-within-weeks-key-chairman-says/ 
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the House Judiciary Committee complained of the lack of progress 
on the issue.203  
Yet, change has only happened at the margins on the federal 
level, such as turning a blind eye to states’ legalization activities. 
Here, I try to offer a few reasons why this process is so difficult, 
even under the best of circumstances. 
A. Is the Public Ahead of Politicians? 
Given the polling,204 observers might assume that the public is 
ahead of policymakers in being ready to advance marijuana 
legalization. This issue polls well in the general public, and when 
presented as a ballot measure, bypassing the politicians, legalization 
efforts have generally, but not always, been successful.205 
But there are important caveats to this political assumption. 
First, ballot measures may fail to address some of the complex, 
historical issues related to equity that might be better handled 
through legislation. Even more telling, several states with 
progressive political environments have failed to pass legislation to 
legalize marijuana, suggesting that there still remain many barriers 
based on law, policy, politics, and equity that remain unresolved. 
High profile failures in New Jersey and New York are not necessarily 
about legalization itself, as that simple question—should adults be 
able to consume marijuana legally?—generally had common 
agreement in those legislatures. Rather, it is the more complex issue 
of whether communities that have been devastated by the legacy of 
the CSA should be able to share in the economic benefits that legal 
sales might bring.206 
 
[http://perma.cc/BC3L-Z8PR] (interviewing House Rules Chairman, Jim McGovern, who 
predicted a vote on legislation to grant states an exemption from the CSA “in a relatively short 
time, within the next several weeks”). 
 203 Tom Angell, Top GOP Congressman Presses Democratic Majority To Pass 
Marijuana Bill, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2019, 10:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/ 
2019/04/04/top-gop-congressman-presses-democratic-majority-to-pass-marijuana-bill/
#1ef04b88faa9 [http://perma.cc/QZ5P-8G4P]. 
 204 Hartig & Geiger, supra note 13. 
 205 See, e.g., Tom Angell, Marijuana Won The Midterm Elections, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2018, 
11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/11/07/marijuana-won-the-midterm-
elections/#453589c93a91 [http://perma.cc/8W7F-BQFD] (“[O]ne clear winner in the midterm 
elections was marijuana.”). But see North Dakota Measure 3, Marijuana Legalization and 
Automatic Expungement Initiative, supra note 183 (noting the failure of a referendum in 
North Dakota). 
 206 Wang, supra note 190 (noting a disagreement between legislators and the New 
York governor over how to invest any revenue derived from recreational sales with one 
legislator arguing, “I’m not willing to create a market that will allow existing wealthy 
people to gain wealth and leave out the people that I represent.”). 
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Second, while polling suggests general support, there are 
differences based on partisan identification and religious 
affiliation that make it less likely that Republicans would 
support legalization efforts.207 For instance, a 2018 Pew poll 
found that, while the overall public supported legalization 62% to 
34%, Republicans were far less likely to support it than 
Democrats and even independents who generally leaned in favor 
of Republican policies.208 Further, white Evangelicals and 
Catholics were more likely to oppose legalization while 
“mainline” Protestants and unaffiliated individuals were more 
likely to support it.209 Similarly, a poll in New York, shortly after 
the legalization effort failed, found that, while a majority of the 
public (55% to 40%) supported such a policy, most Republican 
voters opposed it (40% to 53%).210 
Thus, while states may be reforming their marijuana laws, 
those activities have not necessarily translated to an active debate 
in Congress.211 In part, that is because the means of pursuing policy 
change are not the same at the federal level as in the states.212 
B. Difficulties Building an Evidence Base for Policy Changes 
Another issue is that policy decisions around marijuana are 
often being made without strong scientific evidence because of how 
the CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug. Rather, states 
are looking at other states’ experiences with marijuana 
legalization to learn about best practices and unforeseen issues.213  
 
 207 See, e.g., Warmbrodt, supra note 196 (noting that Banking Committee Chairman 
Crapo is open to considering legislation allowing banks to work with marijuana 
businesses, but does not support amending the CSA to legalize marijuana). 
 208 Hartig & Geiger, supra note 13 (“Republicans are divided, with 45% in favor of 
legalizing marijuana and 51% opposed. Still, the share of Republicans saying marijuana should 
be legal has increased from 39% in 2015. Independents who lean toward the Republican Party 
are far more likely than Republicans to favor marijuana legalization (59% vs. 45%).”). 
 209 Id. (surveying Evangelicals (52% opposed, 43% support), Catholics (44% opposed, 
52% support), white mainline Protestants (31% opposed, 64% support), unaffiliated (19% opposed, 
79% support)). 
 210 Voters on End of Session Agenda: ‘Yes’ on Marijuana (55-40%), SIENA C. RES. INST. 
(June 10, 2019), http://scri.siena.edu/2019/06/10/voters-on-end-of-session-agenda-yes-on-
marijuana-55-40/ [http://perma.cc/8UFY-93BJ]. 
 211 Collective state action may be the catalyst for change at the federal level. See, e.g., 
Kim, supra note 16, at 102 (discussing how, after a majority of states passed language 
authorizing a “right to try” experimental drugs, Congress entered into the policy space to 
pass a federal version of such a “right”). 
 212 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 171 (“Policy change in the states has not led to federal 
reform. Rather, two factors—the ballot initiative (which provided a means for public 
opinion to be heard and invoked) and policy entrepreneurs’ framing efforts (which 
emphasized a medical, compassionate image of marijuana and its users)—have allowed 
the coexistence of two different policy images and approaches.”). 
 213 J.B. Wogan, For This Pot Guy, States Are His Biggest Customers, GOVERNING 
(Aug. 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-marijuana-colorado-andrew-
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But while the economics of legalization are becoming better 
known, the CSA restricts research. The National Academy of 
Medicine (“NAM”) noted in a literature review:  
[The] growing acceptance, accessibility, and use of cannabis and its 
derivatives have raised important public health concerns. Moreover, the 
lack of any aggregated knowledge of cannabis-related health effects has 
led to uncertainty about what, if any, are the harms or benefits from its 
use. . . . As laws and policies continue to change, research must also.214  
Efforts to expand medical research are slowly moving forward 
in response to the NAM concern. In 2016, the DEA called for 
applications from marijuana growers to become licensed 
medical researchers.215 Approval of these applications stalled 
under then-Attorney General Sessions,216 but Attorney General 
Barr since has announced that the DEA has resumed reviewing 
the applications.217 Some hope that other parts of the federal 
government are taking actions that suggest they may becoming 
more receptive to marijuana research.218 
Such research could be useful in validating prior studies, helping 
consumers,219 and making informed policy decisions—especially 
 
freedman-states-regulation.html [http://perma.cc/H5WT-C29T] (“[A]fter voters approve a 
marijuana measure, officials look for advice from the few places with some experience in 
taxing and regulating legal marijuana” with Colorado “field[ing] calls from more than 25 
states asking for guidance.”). 
 214 Nearly 100 Conclusions on the Health Effects of Marijuana and 
Cannabis-Derived Products Presented in New Report, NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (Jan. 12, 
2017), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=24625 
[http://perma.cc/2BHG-LCX2]. 
 215 Applications To Become Registered Under the Controlled Substances Act To 
Manufacture Marijuana To Supply Researchers in the United States, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 53846 (Aug. 12, 2016). 
 216 See Jeffrey Miron, Jeff Sessions Stonewalls Permission for Medical Marijuana 
Research, CATO INST. (July 12, 2018, 11:30 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/jeff-sessions-
stonewalls-permission-medical-marijuana-research [http://perma.cc/3WSK-33UL]. 
 217 Sara Brittany Somerset, The DEA Is Rewriting Obama’s Federal Cannabis 
Regulations, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2019, 2:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarabrittanysomerset/ 
2019/08/28/the-dea-has-rewritten-obamas-federal-cannabis-regulations/#6d7701553dae 
[http://perma.cc/9TG3-MAVM] (noting the difficulties in qualifying because manufacturers 
that already process marijuana in state-licensed arrangements cannot become federally 
qualified producers). 
 218 Compare Hoffmann, supra note 52 (“[T]he first time that the FDA has found the 
marijuana plant, in this case an extract, has an accepted medical use.”), with Jerome Adams, 
Marijuana Use & the Developing Brain, HHS (Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.hhs.gov/ 
surgeongeneral/reports-and-publications/addiction-and-substance-misuse/advisory-on-marijuana-
use-and-developing-brain/index.html [http://perma.cc/74LM-CNWN] (“Science-based messaging 
campaigns and targeted prevention programming are urgently needed to ensure that risks are 
clearly communicated and amplified by local, state, and national organizations.”). 
 219 See, e.g., Bridget Small, Serious health claims for CBD products need proof, FED. 
TRADE COMMISSION CONSUMER INFO. (Sept. 10, 2019), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/ 
09/serious-health-claims-cbd-products-need-proof?utm_source=govdelivery [http://perma.cc/5BT9-
3CCB] (issuing a warning against three companies for making health claims about products 
containing cannabidiol (“CBD”), a chemical compound derived from the cannabis plant). 
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policymakers looking to amend marijuana policy as a means of 
addressing the opioid epidemic. For instance, in 2014, 
researchers found:  
States with medical cannabis laws had a 24.8% lower mean annual 
opioid overdose mortality rate . . . compared with states without 
medical cannabis laws. Examination of the association between 
medical cannabis laws and opioid analgesic overdose mortality in each 
year after implementation of the law showed that such laws were 
associated with a lower rate of overdose mortality that generally 
strengthened over time . . . .220  
The study became widely used in justifying legalization, not only 
domestically, but even internationally.221 Others, though, argue 
that “marijuana is a companion drug rather than substitution 
drug and that marijuana use may be contributing to the opioid 
epidemic rather than improving it”—something that could be 
worrisome if ultimately correct.222 Thus, reflecting the 2017 NAM 
position, some researchers worried: 
For many reasons, ranging from significant barriers to research on 
cannabis and cannabinoids to impatience, cannabis policy has raced 
ahead of cannabis science in the United States. For science to guide 
policy, funding the aforementioned studies must be a priority at the 
federal and state level. Many companies and states (via taxes) are 
profiting from the cannabis industry while failing to support research 
at the level necessary to advance the science. This situation has to 
change to get definitive answers on the possible role for cannabis in 
the opioid crisis, as well as the other potential harms and benefits of 
legalizing cannabis.223 
C. Different Faces Produce Different Laws and Policies 
The prior two sections raised some fundamental questions 
about the legacy of the CSA and our country’s approach to the 
opioid epidemic and lingering resistance to reforming marijuana 
policy. At a time when policymakers seem to be more sympathetic 
 
 220 Marcus A. Bachhuber et al., Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose 
Mortality in the United States, 1999-2010, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668, 1668 (2014). 
 221 Brittany Flaherty, Legalizing medical cannabis reduces opioid overdose deaths? Not 
so fast, new study says, STAT (June 10, 2019), http://www.statnews.com/2019/06/10/ 
legalizing-medical-marijuana-opioid-overdose-deaths/ [http://perma.cc/552B-YDZ3] (quoting 
a researcher in Australia that the 2014 study has “been cited in my own country as 
compelling evidence that medical cannabis reduces opioid overdose deaths”). 
 222 Kenneth Finn, Why Marijuana Will Not Fix the Opioid Epidemic, 115 MO. MED. 
191, 193 (2018), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6140166/pdf/ms115_p0191.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/CF29-GYFL]. 
 223 Kevin P. Hill et al., The Role of Cannabis Legalization in the Opioid Crisis, 178 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 679, 680 (2018). 
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to addiction issues and rethinking sentencing for drug offenses, why 
has it proven difficult to rethink the CSA’s approach to marijuana?  
The same issues continue to repeat themselves: there is a 
segment of society that is uncomfortable with the criminalization 
of drug use and addiction, just as there is a segment of society 
that associates drug use with criminal elements and deviant 
behavior.224 Moreover, there is a long history of associating those 
criminal elements with the poor, minorities, and the youth, and 
this history parallels the move to amend the CSA towards a law 
enforcement approach rather than a public health approach.225 
In this light, CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP seem like 
an aberration, not a change in course, because the policy 
response is due to the face of who was affected initially by the 
opioid epidemic: an older, whiter, and male demographic.226 
Additionally, many of these individuals became addicted, not by 
choice, but because of failures in our healthcare system. Adding 
to this sympathy, some conservative commentators wrote: 
America’s nationwide opioid epidemic has not been accompanied by a 
nationwide crime wave (excepting of course the apparent explosion of 
illicit heroin use). Just the opposite: As best can be told, national 
victimization rates for violent crimes and property crimes have both 
reportedly dropped by about two-thirds over the past two decades.227 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is true that many of the contenders for the Democratic 
presidential nomination support legalization of marijuana, and 
thus could try to initiate the regulatory process in order to change 
how it is regulated under the CSA.228 But in looking at this 
 
 224 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 23 (“[T]wo general and competing models 
emerge¾the ‘deviance’ and ‘victimization’ models of drug abuse.”). 
 225  
To the extent that drug offenders are perceived negatively, undeserving of 
assistance, and deserving of punishment, drug policies are likely to reflect and 
perpetuate these sentiments. Insofar as the population identified with drug use 
overlaps with other populations—racial minorities and the poor—who are already 
viewed as threatening to social order, then punitive policies can appear justified.  
Neill, supra note 64, at 377. 
 226 Rudd, supra note 76, at 1450 tbl.2. 
 227 Eberstadt, supra note 118. But see German Lopez, Why the opioid epidemic may 
have fueled America’s murder spike, VOX (Feb. 6, 2018, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2018/2/6/16934054/opioid-epidemic-murder-violent-crime [http://perma.cc/PR6G-
4JMB] (noting that as the opioid epidemic shifts from prescription drug misuse to use of 
illicit drugs, such as heroin, it may be related to an increase in the murder rate because of 
violence associated with illegal drug trafficking). 
 228 See Paul Demko et al., How Democrats are failing on legalized marijuana, 
POLITICO (May 19, 2019, 7:15 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/19/democrats-
marijuana-legalization-1331710 [http://perma.cc/DNA9-4NW7] (noting that the overwhelming 
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exercise as a matter of a legislative initiative for purposes of this 
symposium, the bottom line, of course, is whether change will occur 
via Congress. Does the passage of CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST 
STEP mean something for marijuana reform and a return to the 
bipartisan compromise that the CSA was initially built upon? 
In looking at the politics behind those bills, I would answer 
no. Personally, I do believe that the tide is turning on reforming 
federal law and policy related to marijuana, but as I have argued 
here, I believe while change is in the future, I do not believe 
change—particularly if we focus solely on change via Congress—is 
on the immediate policy horizon yet. Despite well-welcomed 
changes in the politics and public perception of addiction, these 
are not enough yet to overcome well-worn attitudes and 
presumptions in law and politics.  
 
majority of candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination, as of July 1, 2019, 
support some sort of legalization process). 
